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Abstract: Financial derivatives have been increasingly used by firms to hedge against financial risks. 
However, it is still not clear what factors at the firm level lead to firms’ derivative use and whether 
derivative use can generate performance improvement, especially in the context of firms operating 
in emerging economies. Using the unbalanced panel data consisting of 2529 listed firms from China 
covering an 11-year period from 2005 to 2015, this study examines these two questions regarding 
firms’ use of financial derivatives. Based on results from the empirical analysis, this study identified 
operational cash flow, tax shield, R&D investment, and the possibility of bankruptcy, as the firm-
level factors that enable firms’ decision to invest in financial derivatives. More importantly, empir-
ical findings from this study suggest that a firm’s derivative use tends to negatively affect firm per-
formance, rather than improve firm performance. The negative effect of derivative use on firm per-
formance is not consistent between the two groups of the better performer and poorer performer 
firms. While the poorly performed firms are more likely to use financial derivatives for the purpose 
of performance improvement, their derivative use tends to further damage, rather than improve, 
performance. These research findings have theoretical and practical implications. 
Keywords: financial derivatives; firm performance; Shenzhen stock exchange of China; state-owned 
companies; private-owned enterprises 
 
1. Introduction 
Increasing research attention has been paid to the financial instruments of derivative 
use, due to their increasing popularity with firms. Derivatives refer to the financial invest-
ment such as options and futures, which are used to hedge the financial risks from unex-
pected changes in interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price. Firms use financial 
derivatives to hedge their exposure to various sorts of risk in order to increase their firm 
value. However, the effectiveness of derivative use on risk management and value creation 
has been debated among researchers. According to Modigliani and Miller in the 1950s, in a 
perfect market, risk management should not be relevant to a firm’s value. In addition, Mo-
digliani and Miller (1958) believe that risk can be actively managed by shareholders through 
diversifying their investments. Such theory suggests that firms, by simply reducing the var-
iations of their cash flows or firm values, do not create extra value to the shareholders and 
thus firms should not hedge. 
Several academic pioneers have investigated the relationship between hedging by in-
vesting in financial derivatives and firm value. Carter et al. (2006) study data from the US 
airline industry between 1992 and 2003. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) test currency deriva-
tives using a sample of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms from 1993. Guay (1999) collected data 
from COMPUSTAT on 254 firms from 1990 to 1994 and divided it into derivative users and 
non-derivative users. These studies, in general, find that using derivatives results in a re-
duction of the risk and an increase of the firm performance. 
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The above studies largely focus on firms listed in developed markets where relevant 
regulations, laws, accounting standards, and enforcements are well established. In contrast 
to the abundant studies in developed economies, little attention has been paid to developing 
markets. This has aroused a new question that whether these findings or conclusions also 
apply to developing/emerging economies. Different from developed markets, the financial 
markets of emerging countries are less efficient and can be subject to unsound and incom-
plete laws and regulations. The financial derivative market itself may not be well developed. 
People’s understanding or knowledge of these complicated financial instruments may also 
be limited. Hence, the effectiveness of the derivatives may be even more debatable than in 
the developed markets. Moreover, in these kinds of markets, governments sometimes im-
pose administrative controls, which lead to financial markets being distorted towards the 
direction of government policy. For example, during the Chinese stock market crash in July 
2015, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) limited stock index futures trad-
ing, banned short selling, cut margin ratios, locked up the holdings of large shareholders, 
and investigated shorting big blocks. In addition, on January 4th, 2016, the CSRC imple-
mented a two-step circuit breaker in the Shenzhen Stock Market, which led to January 7th 
having a total trading time of only 15 min. After just four days, the CSRC canceled this 
mechanism. Such practice seems to be suggesting that the financial derivative markets, ra-
ther than helping companies in controlling for risks, are particularly dangerous during mar-
ket turmoil and thus have to be constrained. 
This study aims to explore the use of and the effectiveness of using financial derivatives 
in one of the largest and most important emerging markets—the Chinese stock market. No-
tably, this study addresses two research questions. The first one is what kind of firms are 
more likely to use financial derivatives. Put it in another way, what are the common char-
acteristics shared by the firms that have invested in derivative use? The answer to this ques-
tion is important, as it helps us to have a better understanding of the motivating factors that 
result in firms’ investment in financial derivatives. There has been an abundant number of 
empirical studies exploring which factors or imperfections cause firms to hedge using de-
rivatives, but the findings remain mixed. For example, Allayannis and Weston (2001), ex-
amined the relationship between firm value and the use of foreign currency derivatives by 
studying 720 large firms from 1990 to 1995. They found that the market value of firms using 
hedging derivatives is approximately 5% higher than those not using hedging instruments. 
Similarly, Carter et al. (2006) reported an even higher hedging premium of approximately 
10%. Conversely, Guay and Kothari (2003), through studying a sample of nonfinancial de-
rivative users, argue that the use of derivatives is not significantly associated with the value 
of firms. They argue that this is because the potential premiums on hedging instruments are 
small compared to cash flows in equity value. Jin and Jorion (2006) used a sample from the 
United States oil and gas industry to examine the differences between firms using hedging 
derivatives and those that were not. They found no obvious relationship between using de-
rivatives and a firm’s market value. Carter et al. (2006), Froot et al. (1993), and Bartram et al. 
(2009) examined the relationship between corporate performance and derivative use, and 
provide evidence that using derivative is unnecessary for avoiding the underinvestment 
problem, because internal cash and cash equivalent can address this without increasing ex-
tra risks. 
This study attempts to identify, among our sample companies, which elements or im-
perfections are contributing to the increasing propensity of companies to hedge using de-
rivatives. Particularly, under the special background of emerging markets such as China, it 
will be interesting and meaningful to see whether the conclusion would be different from 
those drawn from the developed markets. 
The second question this study explores is how the use of financial derivatives influ-
ences corporate performance, which has been relatively missing from the literature on 
emerging economies. As we discussed before, derivatives could be particularly dangerous 
or even detrimental if not used properly. Given that financial derivative markets are rela-
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tively young and underdeveloped in China, results from our study could provide extra im-
plication to firms, practitioners as well as market regulators. Furthermore, in Chinese markets, 
there are two main types of companies: state-owned and privately-owned firms. While enjoy-
ing more financial support from the government, the state-owned firms are also subject to 
government control to a greater extent. By looking at the differences among these two types 
of companies in their usage of and the effectiveness of derivatives, we may have more findings 
on how government intervention may affect firms’ risk management as well as efficiency. 
The main findings of this study are summarized as follows: Firstly, we find that, in the 
Chinese market, a firms’ size, operating cash flow, tax shield, research and development in-
vestment, and the possibility of bankruptcy are the main factors that influence a firm’s con-
sideration of investing in derivatives. Secondly, the nature of a firm (i.e., whether it is pri-
vately-owned or state-owned) is not a deciding factor in derivative investment. Thirdly, de-
rivative usage has a negative influence on the performance of firms, and such a finding is 
not altered by whether the firms are state-owned or not. Additionally, it is robust when we 
use different performance measures, and robust when we take into account the lag-in-time 
effect of derivatives. Fourthly, this study separated our sample into firms with better per-
formance and those with poorer performance. We find that the use of derivatives in poorer 
firms is the source of the negative effects, because derivatives investment has no significant 
influence on firms that have the better performance in the sample. This study considers the 
flawed nature of the Chinese derivatives market, and the fact that it is subject to severe con-
trols. The scarcity of professionals employed in Chinese enterprises who are adept at invest-
ing in derivatives may be the main reason for the negative relationship.  
The empirical results suggest that derivatives reduce the firm performance, which 
seems contrary to common beliefs. We conduct further tests to explore this issue by reexam-
ining the relationship between derivative use and firm performance among the top-per-
forming and the bottom-performing firms. The results show that the negative relation only 
significantly exists among bottom-performing firms but disappears among top-performing 
firms. Such results suggest that one possible reason for firms’ failure to use derivatives suc-
cessfully might be their lack of expertise and experience. Thus, it seems unlikely for poorly 
performed firms to improve their situation by adopting financial derivatives. 
The structure of this study is as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review, Section 
3 outlines the data description and the research methods, Section 4 contains the empirical 
analysis, and Section 5 makes conclusions 
2. Theoretical Foundation 
Financial derivatives have been used by firms as an approach to deal with the finan-
cial risks associated with their business transactions, which are generated from unex-
pected changes in the market. Modigliani and Miller (1958) introduced the classic idea 
that shareholders can manage risk by themselves through diversifying their investments 
in a perfect market, where there is no asymmetry of information, no transaction costs, and 
no taxes and agency costs. This means that hedging at the corporate level is not related to 
a firm’s value under such a situation. Similarly, in 2002, Warrant Buffet, the financial in-
vestment guru referred to financial derivatives as ‘financial weapons of mass destruction, 
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.’ Such a statement suggests 
that, if not used properly, financial derivatives may even cause greater risks and reduce 
firm values, rather than reduce risk and add value to the firm. 
Nevertheless, a tremendous number of enterprises do invest in financial derivatives 
in order to hedge the risks, which have resulted from frictions in the market. Thus, there 
is a need to investigate what factors contribute to firms’ decisions to invest in financial 
derivatives and whether firms can benefit from their investment in derivatives. 
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2.1. Firms Characteristics and Use of Financial Derivatives 
Prior research has identified certain firm characteristics as the factors at the firm level that 
can lead to derivative use. Based on a study of 720 large US companies, Allayannis and Wes-
ton (2001) found that companies are more likely to use foreign currency derivatives in order 
to manage risks if they have a larger size and greater leverage, profitability, investment 
growth as well as less financial constraints. Furthermore, empirical findings suggest that 
hedging through investing in financial derivatives is able to relieve underinvestment 
problems, when firms enjoy growth opportunities and when external financing is expen-
sive (Froot et al. 1993; Jin and Jorion 2006). In addition, tax liability is considered as a factor 
associated with derivative use. Smith and Stulz (1985) suggested that firms’ hedging be-
havior may be prompted by tax incentives. When the after-tax incomes of firms demon-
strate more convex functions, the expected taxes can be reduced by derivatives usage. 
Similarly, Graham and Rogers (2002) suggest that hedging through financial derivatives 
at a corporate level is associated with tax incentives, because derivative use can improve 
debt capacity and increase tax benefits. 
The leverage ratio of the firm is also confirmed as an influencing factor (Lau 2016). 
Leverage ratio would affect a firm’s performances, particularly when interest rates change, 
and thus it can influence a firm’s decision whether to invest in financial derivatives as the 
hedging method. For companies with high leverage ratios, the great default risk is embedded 
in their fixed repayment obligations and their operational cash flow will encounter increasing 
volatility. Compared with firms with low operating leverage, firms with high leverage will 
have to endure growing expected costs associated with the possibility of bankruptcy, financial 
distress, and a reduced firm value. Hedging by using financial derivatives allows these firms 
to have more leverage on debt financing and to generate a greater firm value through saving 
on tax. This is because hedging by using derivatives can preserve internal cash flow and in-
crease a firm’s investment success, so that additional cash is generated from derivative use 
(Carter et al. 2006). In addition, costs associated with bankruptcy risk and potential finan-
cial distress can be reduced through hedging by investing in derivatives (Arnold et al. 
2014; Smith and Stulz 1985). 
Smith and Stulz (1985) believe that companies, whose cash flow or income is greatly af-
fected by foreign exchange risk, prefer to use derivatives. Bartram et al (2009) examine the 
automobile industry and notes that the movement of the foreign exchange rate is a significant 
factor in derivative usage. The risk exposure from the movement of the foreign exchange rate, 
as one of three main risks (i.e., unexpected movement of interest rate, foreign exchange rate, 
and commodity prices) for companies, is highly associated with production cost, profits, and 
sales of firms.  
Based on a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing firms from the Compustat database cover-
ing a period from 1993 to 2001, Haushalter et al. (2007) tested the hedging effect of cash hold-
ing. Findings from this study suggest that cash-holding and derivative use have a substitute 
relationship, as both cash-holding and hedging derivative use allow enterprises to minimize 
their need for external capital. Therefore, it is expected that there is a negative relationship 
between cash-holding and derivative use. Based on a differential effect between ambiguity 
and risk, Friberg and Seiler (2017) argue that higher ambiguity is associated with greater 
cash holdings, whereas more risk causes a higher probability of derivative use. Financial con-
straints are identified as a significant factor influencing firms’ decision of whether to invest in 
derivatives as a means of hedging (Froot et al. 1993). When deadweight costs are included 
in the costs of external capital, the underinvestment problem will emerge as internal cash 
flow will be severely insufficient; hedging by using derivatives can generate extra cash 
flow that allows firms to circumvent the underinvestment problem (Froot et al. 1993). 
Smith and Stulz (1985) believe that managers of companies with large stocks and risk 
aversion are more inclined to use derivatives for hedging. Stulz (1984) points out that, if the 
interests of management are mainly affected by the fluctuations of the company’s value, and 
the cost of the company’s use of derivatives is lower than the manager’s own safe-haven 
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costs, then risk-averse managers will perform hedging. Géczy et al. (2007) find that infor-
mation asymmetry, between a company’s management and shareholders, can affect a 
company’s hedging behavior. 
In summary, prior research has identified firm characteristics in terms of firm size, re-
turn on assets, return on equity, R&D investment, CEO shareholding rate, leverage, cash 
holding, foreign exchange gain, and tax liability as the main factors that are likely to influ-
ence a firm’s derivative use. Thus, these factors will be included in the empirical analysis as 
the explanatory variables to address the first question of this study. 
2.2. Derivative Use and Firm Performance 
As shown in the last section, various factors at a corporate level can lead to firms’ in-
vestment in financial derivatives for hedging. However, research results are inconclusive 
regarding whether derivative use is associated with better performance or value of the firm. 
Based on a sample of 720 large firms for the period from 1990 to 1995, Allayannis and Wes-
ton (2001) examined the relationship between firm value and the use of foreign currency 
derivatives. Results from this study suggest that, on average, the market value of firms that 
used hedging derivatives was approximately 5% higher than the value of firms that do not 
use any hedging instruments. Similarly, another study by Carter et al. (2006) reported a 
higher hedging premium of approximately 10%. 
On the other hand, based on a sample of derivative users of nonfinancial firms, Guay 
and Kothari (2003) found that derivative usage does not have a significantly positive influ-
ence on a firm’s value, as the potential premium on hedging instruments is small compared 
to cash flows in equity value. Therefore, they suggest that the effect of derivative use is spu-
rious, and that the slight change in premium is driven by other forms of risk management 
or that. Similarly, based on a sample of companies from the US oil and gas industry, Jin and 
Jorion (2006) found that there was no difference in market value between the firms that used 
hedging derivatives and those that did not. Furthermore, Kim et al. (2006) argue that the pos-
itive impact of using derivatives on firm value, as reported by Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
is difficult to interpret, because of issues such as changes in risk exposure throughout the 
sample, and endogeneity between firm value and hedging. Another empirical study based 
on US airline companies demonstrates that the premium generated from derivative use can 
be attributed to solving underinvestment (Carter et al. 2006). However, derivative use is not 
the only way to resolve the underinvestment problem. Froot et al. (1993) suggest that firms 
tend to choose underinvestment when they encounter significant distress. They further ar-
gue that underinvestment occurs when internal cash flow is low and the costs of external 
capital include deadweight costs are high. Thus, there is no consensus regarding whether 
hedging by using financial derivatives will solve this problem of underinvestment. On the 
other hand, it is clear that derivative use is not the only way for the firm to address the 
underinvestment problem. For example, cash-holding and cash equivalents could be re-
garded as a more direct method for firms to deal with underinvestment issue. 
Based on a sample of firms from 39 countries, Allayannis et al. (2012) examined the in-
teractive relationship between corporate governance, investment in foreign financial deriv-
atives, and firm performance. Findings from this study suggest that they find that when 
companies have strong internal and external corporate governance, there will be a positive 
relationship between derivative use and firm performance (Allayannis et al. 2012). How-
ever, the results from this multi-national study regarding a positive link between derivative 
use and firm performance differ from those generated from single-country studies. For ex-
ample, based on a sample of firms from France, Khediri (2010) found that when a firm in-
creases its investment in financial derivatives, the value of the firm tends to reduce rather 
than increase, and that this reduction of firm value is caused by a lack of premium value 
being assigned to the firm’s derivative use. Similarly, based on a firm sample from the Aus-
tralian market, Nguyen and Faff (2010) found that when a firm makes investments in financial 
derivatives, the value of the firm tends to decrease. Thus, although a large number of empirical 
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studies have focused on the relationship between derivative use and firm performance, em-
pirical results regarding this relationship still remain conflicting with each other. 
A potential factor leading to the conflicting results regarding the relationship between 
derivative use and firm performance is the difference in industries based on which firm 
samples are drawn. Material supply chains and costs of primary goods output in some in-
dustries are exposed to significant volatility, leading to negative consequences on both sales 
and the cost of sales in these industries (Lau 2016). Therefore, when operating in these indus-
tries, firms are more likely to invest in financial derivatives as derivative use may lead to more 
consistent pricing on raw materials and thus avoid unnecessary losses. However, the particu-
larities of specific industries may contribute to the bias in empirical findings regarding the 
relationship between derivative use and firm performance. For example, based on a sample 
of operating firms , Jin and Jorion (2006) found that firm value is not affected by derivative 
use. However, Carter et al. (2006) criticized that the results from Jin and Jorion’s study may 
have been biased, given the fact that firms operating in investors in the US oil and gas industry 
tend to not invest in financial derivatives for the purpose of hedging. 
The inconclusive empirical findings regarding the relationship between derivative 
use and firm performance leads to the second research question of whether firms would 
benefit from their investment in financial derivatives. 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
3.1. Sample Description 
This study aims to answer two questions as: (1) what factors affect a firm’s decision 
to use financial derivatives, and (2) whether derivative use of the firm leads to a positive 
effect on its performances. Data for this study were collected from China Securities Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR). The Shenzhen Stock Market was established in 1990. 
There are two stock exchange markets in China, and while the state-owned corporations 
were mainly listed on the Shanghai Stock Market, companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Market were mostly privately-owned. Previous studies have suggested that firms that face 
large risk are more likely to use financial derivatives in their operations, and that financial 
derivative use tends to have a positive impact on a firm’s value (Allayannis and Weston 
2001; Carter et al. 2006). Compared with state-owned companies, privately-owned firms 
in China tend to suffer more severe financial constraints and face more financial difficul-
ties in their operations, due to a lack of government support. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to sample for this study from the companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Market. 
The sample of this study included 2529 firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
and the Growth Enterprise Market of China. Our unbalanced panel data consists of 8129 
firm-year observations of derivative use and 12,177 firm-year observations for performance, 
covering an 11-year period from 2005 to 2015. In order to eliminate bias generated from the 
differences between industries, firms from all industries listed in the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change have been included in this study, except for the financial industry. The reason for 
excluding firms in the financial industry is that firms in this industry may invest in financial 
derivatives for other reasons rather than hedging. Including financial firms may result in 
bias. Therefore, financial firms (e.g., banks, insurance, and investment companies), compa-
nies subject to Special treatment (ST), and Particular Transfer (PT) were excluded from the 
sample. Table 1 provides a description of the data. 
Table 1. Data description (excluding financial firms). 
Variable N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Derivative_dummy 8129 0.0630 0.243 0 0 0 0 1 
ROA 12,177 0.0410 0.0400 −0.0410 0.0140 0.0370 0.0670 0.125 
ROE 12,177 0.0730 0.0690 −0.0790 0.0300 0.0700 0.113 0.213 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 11,628 0.456 0.894 −2.739 −0.110 0.480 1.020 6.891 
Tobin’s Q 11,628 2.121 1.670 0.350 0.896 1.616 2.774 6.595 
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EBTA 12,151 0.408 0.300 0.0650 0.190 0.324 0.529 1.207 
Leverage 12,177 0.428 0.213 0.0910 0.248 0.420 0.603 0.802 
Net Profit Margin 12,158 0.154 7.507 −277.9 0.0230 0.0670 0.141 715.1 
Assets Turnover 12,177 0.600 0.387 0.144 0.313 0.498 0.770 1.600 
Size 12,177 21.92 1.331 14.94 21.00 21.75 22.64 28.51 
Operating Cash Flow 12,158 0.0700 0.149 −0.267 −0.00200 0.0690 0.155 0.368 
CEO_TS 11,841 0.138 0.212 0 0 0.00100 0.256 0.897 
Z 11,627 0.618 0.383 0.162 0.333 0.518 0.785 1.603 
Cash Holding 12,152 0.423 0.421 0.0430 0.130 0.260 0.554 1.616 
Capital Expenditure 12,158 0.123 0.131 0.00400 0.0290 0.0740 0.164 0.492 
This table reports the information obtained from the sample, which has been collected from the 
CSMAR from 2005 to 2015. This sample covers 8129 derivative observations and 12,177 firm perfor-
mance observations in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM).  In 
this table, ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; Tobin’s Q, is adopted to measure a 
firm’s market value at the stock exchange market, Ln(Tobin’s Q) is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s 
Q; EBTA is earnings before interests and tax scaled by total assets; Leverage is the leverage ratio 
which is calculated by dividing debt by size; Net Profit Margin is profit over sales, to capture the 
effects of profitability on firms’ performance; Assets Turnover is calculated by sales over book value 
of total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Operating Cash Flow is the firm’s 
cash flow scaled by total assets; CEO_TS is the stockholding ratio of CEO of the firm; Z is the Altman 
Z-score, which measures the bankruptcy risk of the firm; Cash Holding is cash and cash equivalents 
scaled by total assets; Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure over total assets. 
To eliminate the impact of the industry, our regression model controlled the variable 
of the industry. This variable was denoted by the industry code developed by China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). When operationalizing the variable in the study, 
we kept the original CSRC codes for the primary classification of the industries (i.e., the 
first letter of the CSRC industry codes for industries was retained) except the manufactur-
ing industry. As shown in Table 2, over 60% of the companies in the sample came from 
the single industry of manufacturing, and this more severe outlier in terms of the industry 
could generate bias in model estimations. Thus, firms in the manufacturing industry re-
quired a secondary classification. 
Table 2. Industrial distribution of the sample (excluding the financial industry) 1. 
Industry Frequency Percentage Cumulation 
A 39 1.54 1.54 
B 67 2.65 4.19 
C 1629 64.41 68.6 
D 85 3.36 71.97 
E 64 2.53 74.5 
F 151 5.97 80.47 
G 83 3.28 83.75 
H 10 0.4 84.14 
I 139 5.5 89.64 
K 132 5.22 94.86 
L 27 1.07 95.93 
M 18 0.71 96.64 
N 24 0.95 97.59 
O 3 0.12 97.71 
P 1 0.04 97.75 
Q 3 0.12 97.86 
R 29 1.15 99.01 
S 25 0.99 100 
Total 2,529 100  
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1 This table shows the industry distribution of all 2529 firms in the sample. The first column shows the 
CSMAR industry code. The manufacturing industry, which is represented by C, occupies 64.41% of the 
total sample. Therefore, the firms in the manufacturing industry have secondary classification codes. 
Based on the difference in ownership, the firms included in the sample can be divided 
into two groups of privately-owned and state-owned companies. In comparison with state-
owned companies, private firms are more likely to use derivatives to hedge against finan-
cial risks. State-owned companies are significantly different from private firms along the 
dimension of objectives, resource endowment, operational risks, and government inter-
vention (Yang et al. 2017). With the support from the Chinese government, state-owned 
firms have easier access to financial and credit approval than their privately-owned coun-
terparts. With the encouragement from the Chinese government, banks provide more fi-
nancial support to state-owned firms, even though some of them have lower productivity 
than privately-owned enterprises, resulting in low efficient capital investment by state-
owned companies (Chang and Boontham 2017; Song et al. 2011). Even over 30 years after 
the reform and opening-up of the Chinese economic policies, there has been still a bias 
against privately-owned firms in markets and banks, such as charging higher interest rates 
and imposing harsher conditions (Yang et al. 2017). Therefore, private firms rely more on 
their internal funds, such as cash and cash equivalents, than state-owned companies, and 
have more incentives to use derivatives in order to stabilize their cash flows. 
Table 3 demonstrates the differences in characteristics between firms that use and those 
that do not use derivatives. The differences between users and non-users of derivatives 
leads us to the first research question of the study: which factors lead to the use of deriva-
tives by Chinese firms? Moreover, observing the performance indicators (measured as ROA, 
ROE, and Tobin’s Q) as shown in Table 3, non-users of derivatives have slightly outper-
formed derivative users. This observation suggests that it is uncertain whether derivative 
use has a positive effect on firm performance. Therefore, we have the second research 
question of this study: do firms truly benefit from their derivative use? 
Table 3. The description of derivative-using firms and non-derivative-using firms. 1. 
Panel A  
Variables Derivative_dummy = 0 N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Derivative_dummy 7618 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ROA 7049 0.0450 0.0400 −0.0410 0.0170 0.0420 0.0710 0.125 
ROE 7049 0.0720 0.0660 −0.0790 0.0310 0.0690 0.109 0.213 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 6697 0.627 0.829 −2.182 0.137 0.635 1.150 6.891 
Tobin’s Q 6697 2.375 1.678 0.350 1.147 1.886 3.158 6.595 
Growth 7031 0.392 0.280 0.0650 0.195 0.319 0.498 1.207 
Leverage 7049 0.377 0.207 0.0910 0.200 0.350 0.534 0.802 
Net Profit Margin 7037 0.237 8.859 −58.38 0.0310 0.0830 0.160 715.1 
Asset Turnover 7049 0.564 0.362 0.144 0.304 0.470 0.708 1.600 
Size 7049 21.56 1.089 14.94 20.83 21.44 22.14 26.07 
Operating Cash Flow 7037 0.0700 0.149 −0.267 −0.00400 0.0710 0.157 0.368 
CEO_TS 6975 0.197 0.232 0 0 0.0590 0.399 0.897 
Z 6697 0.584 0.357 0.162 0.327 0.491 0.728 1.603 
Cash Holding 7034 0.490 0.458 0.0430 0.149 0.316 0.675 1.616 
Capital Expenditure 7037 0.137 0.137 0.00400 0.0370 0.0870 0.185 0.492 
Panel B         
Variables 
Derivatives_dummy = 1 
N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Derivatives_dummy 511 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
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ROA 476 0.0400 0.0380 −0.0410 0.0140 0.0360 0.0620 0.125 
ROE 476 0.0740 0.0680 −0.0790 0.0320 0.0650 0.115 0.213 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 454 0.306 0.826 −2.489 −0.178 0.366 0.860 2.829 
Tobin’s Q 454 1.816 1.396 0.350 0.837 1.442 2.364 6.595 
EBTA 475 0.283 0.216 0.0650 0.146 0.220 0.342 1.207 
Leverage 476 0.443 0.209 0.0910 0.274 0.442 0.615 0.802 
Net Profit Margin 475 0.0590 0.0820 −0.443 0.0170 0.0410 0.0850 0.601 
Asset Turnover 476 0.788 0.409 0.144 0.455 0.759 1.034 1.600 
Size 476 22.21 1.340 19.63 21.19 21.97 22.86 27.14 
Operating Cash Flow  475 0.0640 0.116 −0.267 0.0120 0.0640 0.124 0.368 
CEO_TS 474 0.153 0.222 0 0 0.0190 0.260 0.775 
Z 454 0.804 0.403 0.162 0.474 0.780 1.047 1.603 
Cash Holding 474 0.264 0.310 0.0430 0.0710 0.156 0.305 1.616 
Capital Expenditure  475 0.103 0.112 0.00400 0.0290 0.0620 0.136 0.492 
1 Panel A presents the information regarding derivative non-users and Panel B presents the information regarding deriv-
ative users. The firm performance of derivative non-users (the median value of ROA, ROE, Ln (Tobin’s Q), and Tobin’s 
Q) is slightly better than that of derivative users. 
3.2. Estimation Models 
Our empirical estimations were based on the dataset of the unbalanced panel data. In 
comparison to other types of data such as time-series data and cross-sectional data, the panel 
data type of longitudinal data has unique advantages, including its ability to detect and 
measure statistical effects that either pure time series or cross-sectional data cannot, as well 
as the ability to minimize estimation biases that may arise from aggregating time series 
groups into a single time series. However, when using panel data for estimation, some po-
tential problems need to be addressed. First, there is a probability that the variables from 
different firms in the data are not independent. Second, when the estimations involve a large 
number of parameters, standard regression methods could become ill-posed. Our study ad-
dressed the issue of potential correlations among the sampled firms. We performed regres-
sion analysis clustered by firms. To meet the independent and identical distribution, we 
allowed for correlation among residuals with groups, but rejected the presence of correla-
tion between different groups. 
An alternative modeling method is linear stochastic approximations. Stochastic ap-
proximation methods are a family of iterative methods typically used for root-finding prob-
lems or for optimization problems. The recursive update rules of stochastic approximation 
methods can be used for solving linear systems when the collected data is corrupted by 
noise, or for approximating extreme values of the function, which cannot be computed di-
rectly by only estimated via noisy observations (Kouritzin 1996; Nemirovski et al. 2009; Tou-
lis and Airoldi 2015). A major advantage of linear stochastic approximation methods lies in 
the fact that they can facilitate estimation with a large amount of data, in which model pa-
rameters are updated sequentially using small batches of data at each step (Toulis and 
Airoldi 2015). 
3.2.1. Estimation Model for Firm Characteristics and Derivative Use  
Based on our review of previous studies in the last section regarding firm character-
istics and derivative use, we developed the following model to examine factors that lead 
to derivative use by Chinese firms: Derivatives_dummy= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln size , + 𝛽 OPERCF_a , + 𝛽 Leverage ,  + 𝛽 ExGain ,+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ , + 𝛽 CEO_TS , + 𝛽 RD_dummy , + 𝛽 Z , + 𝛽 𝐷𝑒𝑝_𝑎 ,+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐸 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 , + 𝜀, (1)
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Derivatives_dummy= 𝛽 + 𝛽 ln size , + 𝛽 OPERCF_a , + 𝛽 Leverage ,  + 𝛽 ExGain ,+ 𝛽 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ , + 𝛽 CEO_TS , + 𝛽 RD_dummy , + 𝛽 Z , + 𝛽 𝐷𝑒𝑝_𝑎 ,+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐸 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑠 𝑄 , + 𝛽 SOE + 𝜀, (2)
where Derivatives_dummy  as the dependent variable equals 1, if firm i uses derivatives 
at time t, otherwise it equals 0. Equation (1) provides a baseline model to examine the 
relationship between firm characteristics and derivative use. Equation (2) adds firm own-
ership (SOE) to examine the effect of the firm’s ownership structure on derivative use. In 
either Equations (1) or (2), 𝜀 represents the idiosyncratic error term at time t. 
The explanatory variables are included as: 
(1) ln size ,  is the size level of a firm i at time t. 
(2) OPERCF_a ,  is the operational cash flow of a firm i at time t. 
(3) Leverage ,  is the leverage ratio which is calculated by dividing debt by size. 
(4) ExGain ,  indicates the exchange gains of firm i at time t. 
(5) 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ ,  is the growth rate of the operational revenue of a firm i at time t. 
(6) CEO_TS ,  is the stockholding ratio of CEO of the firm i at time t. 
(7) RD_dummy ,  is a dummy variable to judge if firm i has made research and develop-
ment investment at time t. 
(8) Z ,  is the Altman Z-score, which measures the bankruptcy risk of firm i at time t. 
(9) 𝐷𝑒𝑝_𝑎 ,  measures the tax shield of firm i at time. 
(10)–(12) Three variables represent the performance of the firm, measured by ROA, ROE 
and Tobin’s Q, respectively. 
(13) SOE  is the dummy variable to analyze ownership of the firms, which equals to 0 if 
the observation is a private enterprise, and it equals to 1 if the observation is a state-
owned enterprise. 
The Logit model was selected to estimate Equations (1) and (2), as the dependent vari-
able of derivative use is a binary-choice dummy. The Logit model is a widely used analytical 
method for binary-choice estimation. In comparison to the Probit model, it provides an un-
ambiguous and concise setting on result explanation, because the cumulative distribution 
function in logistic distribution specifies an analytical expression while the standard distri-
bution in the Probit model does not (Wooldridge 2010). As shown in Table 3 (Panels A and 
B), data for firms’ derivative use are highly unbalanced, with an overwhelming majority of 
firms reported as non-derivative users. If untreated, empirical estimation may suffer from 
potential event bias. Following (King and Zeng 2001), we applied the bias-corrected estima-
tions in our regression analysis so that empirical results would not be biased from the 
unbalanced distribution of the derivative use as the dummy variable.  
As shown in the Results section, four model specifications were performed. Model (1) 
is the benchmark regression used to test the common phenomenon. Model (2) adds two 
fixed variables (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟) in order to control the effects of industry and time. In 
Model (3), the full sample is split into two groups of state-owned and privately-owned firms 
by adding the variable of SOE to examine. The differences between these two types of firms 
in terms of their derivative use. Based on Model (3), Model (4) controls the effects of industry 
and time.  
3.2.2. Estimation Model for Derivative Use and Firm Performance  
In order to examine the relationship between derivative use and firm performance, 
Models (3) and (4) were developed, and three variables were adopted as the measures of 
firm performance. Following previous studies (Bartram et al. 2011; Jin and Jorion 2006), 
Tobin’s Q, is adopted to measure a firm’s market value at the stock exchange market, and 
it is a proxy of firm performance in Model (3). By measuring the market value created 
over the book value, Tobin’s Q helps to produce market values comparable across sample 
firms and mitigates any scale effects. Following previous research (Choi et al. 2013; Gay 
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et al. 2011), Model (4) uses Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) as indi-
cators for firm performance, were introduced in this study.  Tobin s Q , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 ∗ Derivatives_dummy , + ∑ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 , + 𝜀, (3)Tobin s Q = (    )∗  ∗ ∗  (  )   Firm performance , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 ∗ Derivatives_dummy , + 𝛽 ∗ Derivatives_dummy , ∗ SOE + ∑ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 , + 𝜀. (4)
In Models (3) and (4), derivative use is the independent variable. In Model (4), Deriva-
tives_dummy_(i,t)*SOE_i is included to measure the different effects between private and 
state-owned companies. The control variables and their definitions are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Description of control variables. 
Control Variable Definition 
SOE 
The dummy of a firm’s nature from CSMAR, which equals to 0 if the firm is privately-owned 
and equals to 1 if the firm is state-owned. It is used to control the effects of a firm’s’ ownership 
structure. 
Size The Napierian Logarithm of a firm’s total assets, to control the relationship between a firm’s size and its performance  
Operating Cash Flow Using a firm’s cash flow scaled by total assets to control the relationship between a firm’s op-erations and its performance 
Depreciation Depreciation scaled by total assets to establish the effects of tax shields on a firm’s perfor-mance 
CEO_TS The ratio of shareholding by a CEO is introduced to control the potential relationship between agent costs and a firm’s performance 
RD_dummy Is used to judge whether companies invest in research and development to control the under-
investment problem and firm performance 
Z 
The Altman Z-score is used to control the influences of bankruptcy costs on a firm’s perfor-
mance. This variable is calculated by the formula: Z = 0.012 ∗ 𝑋 + 0.014 ∗ 𝑋 + 0.033 ∗ 𝑋 +0.006 ∗ X + 0.999 ∗ 𝑋 , where, 𝑋 = (liquid asset-liquid debt)/total assets; 𝑋 = retained earn-
ings/total assets; 𝑋 = EBIT/total assets; X = market value of common shares and preferred 
stock/total debt; 𝑋 = total sales/total assets 
Leverage 
The leverage ratio is calculated by total debt over total assets, to establish the relationship be-
tween capital structure and a firm’s performance 
Exchange Gain 
Exchange gain scaled by total assets is used to control the impacts of movements of foreign 
exchange rates on a firm’s performance 
Following Lau (2016), pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model was 
adopted to empirically examine the effect of derivative use on firm performance. In 
pooled OLS model, clustering by each firm can cut out the potential interactions among 
individual firms and thus generate the independence of probability. Before performing a 
dynamic panel data analysis, three statistical issues need special treatment. First, firm-
specific, time-specific, and industry-specific effects in the dataset may have potential im-
plications in empirical estimations, because the residuals of a given firm, a given year, or 
a given industry may be correlated across years or firms (i.e., time-series dependence and 
cross-sectional dependence). Second, the choice between fixed-effects and random-effects 
model specifications needs to be made. Third, although this paper focuses only on the use 
of financial derivatives with the purpose of hedging, the relationship between derivative 
use and its explanatory variables may not be clear-cut. As the nature of hedging by using 
derivatives is a type of investment, the reverse causality may arise with the feedback ef-
fects between firm profitability and corporate hedging capacity. 
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Several diagnostic tests were performed to address these three statistical issues. First, 
the Hausman test was performed, and the results suggest that the idiosyncrasies in the 
cross-section data need to be fixed, and thus the fixed-effects model was adopted for 
model estimation. Second, time-effects and industry-effects were also controlled in the 
model estimation, and the results are reported following benchmark regressions in the 
respective tables of results. Third and more importantly, robust standard error estima-
tions with a fixed-effects model were performed to control the potential problems with 
the endogeneity in the data. Prior research suggests that robust standard error estimations 
(FE-SE or RE-SE) in either fixed-effects or random-effects model are found to be unbiased 
due to the permanent firm-effect (Abadie et al. 2017; Cameron and Miller 2015; Petersen 
2009). Thus, the potential problem of endogeneity was effectively addressed.  
As shown in Results section, four model specifications of the pooled OLS estimation 
were performed for each of the three performance measures respectively (ROA, Tobin’s 
Q, and ROE). The first one is a benchmark regression, including all the control variables 
except the variable of SOE. The second regression model controlled the effects of time and 
industry. The third regression (Model 4) added Derivatives_dummy_(i,t)*SOE_i and the 
control variable of SOE. Based on regression three, the fourth regression controlled the 
effects of time and industry. 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1. Firm Characteristics and Derivative use 
Table 5 demonstrates the empirical results regarding the factors that influence com-
panies’ decisions on whether to use financial derivatives. Six variables of firm size, oper-
ational cash flow, tax shield (measured as depreciation divided by total assets), R&D in-
vestment, bankruptcy possibility (represented by Z-score), and Tobin’s Q, are significant 
across all four model specifications. As shown in the specifications of Models 3 and 4, 
ROA is significant after controlling the variable of firm ownership. However, the variable 
of firm ownership is insignificant after controlling the effects of time and industry. 
Table 5. Factors that impact a firms’ decision to use derivatives 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Derivatives_dummy Derivatives_dummy Derivatives_dummy Derivatives_dummy 
SOE   −0.366 ** −0.186 
   −2.14 −1.05 
Ln(size) 0.441 *** 0.491 *** 0.440 *** 0.489 *** 
 9.02 8.18 9.04 8.20 
Cash Flow 1.734 ** 1.504 * 1.708 ** 1.485 * 
 2.33 1.83 2.29 1.81 
Depreciation −0.572 −1.027 * −0.532 −1.042 * 
 −1.18 −1.66 −1.10 −1.69 
CEO_TS 0.185 0.003 0.237 0.031 
 0.73 0.01 0.92 0.11 
RD_dummy 0.944 *** 0.469 *** 0.937 *** 0.473 *** 
 7.37 2.92 7.30 2.94 
Z 0.547 *** 0.596 *** 0.543 *** 0.595 *** 
 9.88 8.34 9.82 8.35 
Leverage −0.074 0.008 −0.054 0.014 
 −0.27 0.04 −0.21 0.08 
Exchange Gain −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 −0.19 −0.70 −0.21 −0.70 
Growth −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 
 −0.54 −0.51 −0.59 −0.53 
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ROE 1.039 * 0.875 1.048 * 0.882 
 1.71 1.39 1.73 1.41 
ROA −4.136 ** −2.735 −4.105 ** −2.755 * 
 −2.54 −1.64 −2.54 −1.68 
Tobin’s Q −0.093 *** −0.144 *** −0.095 *** −0.145 *** 
 −2.73 −3.14 −2.78 −3.16 
Fixed Effects NO Yes NO Yes 
N 8387 7715 8387 7715 
1 This table shows the factors that may affect firms’ decisions regarding hedging using derivatives. These factors are: firm 
size, operating cash flow, tax shield (represented by depreciation divided by total assets), research and development invest-
ment, possibility of bankruptcy (represented by Z-score), ROA, and Tobin’s Q. After controlling the effects of time and 
industry, the nature of a firm is not a deciding factor of derivative usage. t—statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
The significant effect of firm size suggests that larger companies are more likely to in-
vest in financial derivatives. Two factors may contribute to this result. First, larger firms 
have a higher level of risk exposure in comparison to smaller firms, due to their more exten-
sive operations. Second, larger firms are financially more capable of performing complex 
derivative operations by hiring professional managers. Firms with more cash flow are more 
likely to use derivatives, as these firms have a stronger need to stabilize their daily opera-
tions against the financial risks from the uncertainty associated with unexpected changes of 
exchange and interest rates. A higher R&D level indicates that the firms have more invest-
ment opportunities. As a result, these firms are more likely to engage in derivative use to 
safeguard the R&D investment. A lower Altman Z-score means a firm has a larger proba-
bility of bankruptcy. Therefore, a positive relationship between a Z-score and the derivative 
usage dummy indicates that firms with lower bankruptcy risk are more likely to use deriv-
atives. The negative impact of tax shields (represented by depreciation to total assets) on a 
firm’s derivative use indicates that companies that enjoy more tax benefits tend to reduce 
their derivative investment. 
When it comes to the influence of a firm’s performance variables, the negative rela-
tionships between derivative use and ROA, as well as between derivative use and Tobin’s 
Q, support the suggestion that firms in the Chinese market tend to invest in financial de-
rivatives with the purpose to improve firm performance. 
4.2. Derivative Use and Firm Performance 
In this section, we address the issue of whether the investment in financial deriva-
tives can result in improvement of the firm performance. Here, firm performance is meas-
ured by the three indicators of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. 
Table 6 demonstrates the effect of derivative use on ROA as one measure of firm 
performance. As shown in Table 6, four model specifications are performed. Model 1 is 
the benchmark model. Based on Model 1, Model 2 adds two control variables of time and 
industry. Model 3 tests derivative use on ROA in terms of the two different firm groups 
(state-owned and private firms) by adding the dummy variable SOE. Based on Model 3, 
Model 4 adds two control variables of time and industry. Some control variables are au-
tomatically removed by Stata due to multicollinearity. 
The results shown in Table 6 suggest that derivative use negatively affects ROA (Model 
1), although the negative impact is slightly reduced when the effects of time and industry are 
controlled in Model 2. Results from Model 3 demonstrates that private enterprises are more 
seriously exposed to the negative effects of using derivatives (−0.014), while state-owned com-
panies also suffer from these negative effects of derivative use, but the magnitude is less severe 
in comparison to that of the private firms. The reason for the difference most likely lies in the 
fact that state-owned companies have better access to significant financial support from the 
Chinese government. Financial support from the government can lead to increased profita-
bility and investor confidence, thus partly offsetting the negative effects of using derivatives, 
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such as the negative return of derivatives and the loss of effectiveness when risks erupt in 
the whole market (e.g., when the stock market crashed in 2015). 
Table 6. The effects of derivative use on ROA 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Derivative_dummy −0.007 *** −0.006 *** −0.012 ** −0.008 
 (−4.39) (−3.39) (−2.09) (−1.56) 
Derivative_dummy *SOE   0.005 0.003 
   (0.80) (0.53) 
SOE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.53) (1.13) (1.24) (0.93) 
Size 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 
 (16.29) (19.07) (16.28) (19.05) 
Asset Turnover 0.023 *** 0.031 *** 0.023 *** 0.031 *** 
 (19.90) (24.40) (19.89) (24.39) 
Net Profit Margin 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 (4.46) (5.04) (4.45) (5.03) 
Leverage −0.107 *** −0.105 *** −0.107 *** −0.105 *** 
 (−46.18) (−43.90) (−46.16) (−43.89) 
Fixed Effects NO Yes NO Yes 
N 7512 7512 7512 7512 
R2 0.238 0.315 0.239 0.315 
Adjust R2 0.238 0.310 0.238 0.310 
1 In this table, four regressions are introduced. The first column is the benchmark regression of model 
(3). The second column is based on the first regression but controls the effects of time and industry. 
The third column is the benchmark regression of model (4). The fourth column is based on the third 
regression but controls the effects of time and industry. This table shows that using derivatives has 
negative effects on ROA, and that the nature of a company has no impact on the outcomes of using 
derivatives. Some variables included are automatically removed by Stata due to multicollinearity. 
t—statistics in parentheses ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
In order to further examine the relationship between derivative use and firm perfor-
mance, we replaced the performance measure of ROA with another two performance indi-
cators of Tobin’s Q and ROE. Table 7 presents the model results with Tobin’s Q as the per-
formance measure. Similar to the case in Table 6, we performed four model specifications. 
As shown in Table 7, derivative use has a significant but negative effect on the dependent 
variable of Tobin’s both in Models 2 and 4. These results confirmed the negative effect of 
derivative use on firm performance. Further, this negative effect is consistent across both 
state-owned and private firms. 
Table 7. The effects of derivative use on Tobin’s Q 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Derivative_dummy −0.033 −0.079 *** −0.193 * −0.163 ** 
 (−1.06) (−3.29) (−1.94) (−2.17) 
Derivative_dummy *SOE   0.176 * 0.093 
   (1.70) (1.19) 
SOE −0.030 −0.002 −0.045 −0.011 
 (−1.03) (−0.11) (−1.48) (−0.46) 
Size −0.312 *** −0.364 *** −0.312 *** −0.364 *** 
 (−39.07) (−57.01) (−39.10) (−57.03) 
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Asset Turnover 0.012 0.175 *** 0.012 0.175 *** 
 (0.60) (9.50) (0.58) (9.48) 
Net profit margin 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
 (4.12) (5.41) (4.09) (5.40) 
Leverage −1.327 *** −1.083 *** −1.326 *** −1.083 *** 
 (−31.06) (−31.12) (−31.04) (−31.11) 
Fixed Effects NO Yes NO Yes 
N 7140 7140 7140 7140 
R2 0.439 0.685 0.439 0.685 
Adjust R2 0.438 0.683 0.438 0.683 
1 In this table, four regressions are introduced. The first column is the benchmark regression of 
model (3). The second column is based on the first regression but controls the effects of time and 
industry. The third column is the benchmark regression of model (4). The fourth column is based 
on the third regression but controls the effects of time and industry. This table shows that using 
derivatives brings negative effects on Tobin’s Q and that the nature of a company has no impact on 
the outcomes of using derivatives, after controlling the effects of time and industry. t—statistics in 
parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The same procedure of four model specifications is performed after adopting ROE as 
the measure of firm performance. The results are presented in Table 8. The regression 
results are qualitative, similar as with the case of using ROA and Tobin’s Q as measures 
of firm performance. Thus, the negative effect of derivative use on firm performance is 
further confirmed. 
Table 8. The effects of derivative use on ROE 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Derivative_dummy −0.010 *** −0.006 * −0.016 −0.010 
 (−3.14) (−1.95) (−1.57) (−1.00) 
Derivative_dummy *SOE   0.007 0.004 
   (0.65) (0.42) 
SOE 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (1.39) (1.12) (1.14) (0.95) 
Size 0.012 *** 0.014 *** 0.012 *** 0.014 *** 
 (15.83) (18.45) (15.81) (18.44) 
Asset Turnover 0.037 *** 0.054 *** 0.037 *** 0.054 *** 
 (17.95) (23.66) (17.94) (23.65) 
Net Profit Margin 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 (4.62) (5.18) (4.61) (5.17) 
Leverage −0.065 *** −0.067 *** −0.065 *** −0.067 *** 
 (−15.60) (−15.52) (−15.59) (−15.52) 
Control Year and industry NO Yes NO Yes 
N 7512 7512 7512 7512 
R2 0.073 0.175 0.073 0.175 
Adjust R2 0.072 0.169 0.072 0.169 
1 In this table, four regressions are introduced. The first column is the benchmark regression of 
model (3). The second column is based on the first regression but controls the effects of time and 
industry. The third column is the benchmark regression of model (4). The fourth column is based 
on the third regression but controls the effects of time and industry. This table shows that using 
derivatives has negative effects on ROE, and that the nature of a company has no impact on the 
outcomes of using derivatives. t—statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01. 
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In summary, derivative use tends to exert a negative effect on firm performance as 
measured by indicators of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. This means that using derivatives 
reduces a company’s performance. Two factors may be associated with the negative ef-
fects of derivative use on firm performance in the context of firms from China. First, com-
pared with developed markets, the market of financial derivatives in China is flawed and 
suffers from tight control of government agencies. Insufficient hedging instruments mean 
that Chinese firms often fail to manage the risks through using derivatives. Moreover, the 
intervening actions were taken by various government agencies such as China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) after the stock market crashed in 2015 led to a high level 
of difficulty for Chinese firms to invest in derivatives, and thus it is impractical for Chinese 
firms to use investment in financial derivatives as an effective method when managing 
business risks. Second, there is a severe lack of skills and expertise in Chinese firms in 
relation to business transactions for investment in financial derivatives. Investments in 
financial derivatives made by inexperienced operators contribute to the risks of corpora-
tions and reduce their performance. 
It takes time for the derivative use to generate influence on firm performance, espe-
cially when firms just initiated derivative use first time. In order to consider the time effect 
of derivative use, we examined the relationship between derivative use and firm perfor-
mance by taking a time lag of one year. For this analysis, firm performance is measured 
by the three financial indicators of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, respectively. Table 9 shows 
the effect of derivative use in the past on the firm performance in the current period. The 
first column for each performance indicator presents the results of the benchmark regres-
sion, and the results of the second column have controlled time and industry effects. As 
shown in Table 9, derivative use has a significant and negative effect on both ROA and 
ROE as the measures of firm performance, and these negative effects remain when the 
time lag effect has been controlled. On the other hand, derivate use has no significant 
effect on firm performance when performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Table 9. The lagged effects of derivative use on firm performance 1. 
 ROA ROA ROE ROE TQ TQ Lag(Derivative_dummy)  −0.08 *** −0.008 *** −0.013 *** −0.011 *** −0.037 −0.039 
 (−3.99) (−3.95) (−3.64) (−3.27) (−0.55) (−0.63) 
SOE −0.002 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001 −0.071 −0.054 
 (−1.02) (1.29) (−0.03) (−0.38) (−1.26) (−1.04) 
Size −0.002 *** −0.001 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** −0.660 *** −0.694 *** 
 (−5.42) (−3.97) (9.61) (11.46) (−52.03) (−59.28) 
Asset Turnover 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.037 *** 0.034 *** −0.305 *** −0.245 *** 
 (12.79) (12.45) (19.78) (18.72) (−8.55) (−7.48) 
Net Profit Margin 0.000 * 0.000 ** −0.000 * −0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (1.68) (2.05) (−1.67) (−1.40) (0.20) (0.92) 
Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES 
N 11429 11429 11429 11429 10788 10788 
R2 0.0175 0.0378 0.0426 0.0624 0.2140 0.3488 
Adjust R2 0.0171 0.0367 0.0422 0.0613 0.2136 0.3480 
1 In this table, three different indicators of firm performance (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) are used to test the lagged effects 
of using derivatives. For each indicator, the first column is the benchmark regression. The second column is based on the 
first regression, but the effects of time and industry are controlled. This table shows that derivative usage on forwarding 
time has a significantly negative influence on ROA and ROE, but no significant impact on firm value. t—statistics in pa-
rentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 9 demonstrates the negative effect of using derivatives in the past on the firm’s 
current performance. This negative effect with time lag is consistent with the results from 
the empirical analyses in the last section. Two factors may explain this negative effect even 
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with lagged time effect being controlled. Firstly, the ineffectual operation of investment 
in financial derivatives may increase the risk exposure of companies and then damage the 
firm’s performance. Secondly, investment in hedging is not free. Usually, hedging by de-
rivatives sacrifices returns as a prerequisite. Therefore, when firms increase investment in 
financial derivatives, investing firms will expect firm performance to decline in the future 
to some extent. The lack of impact on firm value (presented by Tobin’s Q) may be due to 
derivative use only affecting the value of the firm during the current period. However, in 
the subsequent time periods, internal factors can have more obvious effects on firm value 
rather than just derivative investment. 
4.3. Further Empirical Analysis 
Results generated from our examination of the first research question (what type of 
firms are more likely to invest in financial derivatives) suggest that firms with poorer per-
formance are more likely to invest in derivatives. However, results from our examination 
of the second research question (the relationship between derivative use and firm perfor-
mance) demonstrate that derivative use tends to reduce, rather than improve, firm per-
formance. To examine these seemingly contradictory empirical results, we conducted the 
further empirical analysis. 
To conduct this further analysis, we split the full sample of firms into sub-samples. 
First, based on differences in terms of ROA among the sampled firms, we split the full 
sample into two sub-samples, and they are the firms with a ROA value higher and lower 
than the median value of the full sample. Second, based on differences in terms of ROE 
among the sampled firms, we also split the full sample into two sub-samples of firms with 
a ROE value higher and lower than the median value of the full sample, respectively. 
Then, we introduced the performance indicator Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable to 
examine the relationship between derivative use and firm performance. The expected re-
sult is that derivative use will lead to a reduction of performance for those firms whose 
operations are less successful. 
For this further regression analysis of the relationship between derivative use and 
firm performance, we adopted the conceptual model developed by Carter et al. (2006). 
The model is provided below. All the control variables included in the model are listed in 
Table 10. Tobin s Q = Derivative_dummy , + ∑ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 , + 𝜀. (5)
Table 10. The control variables for the further test. 
Control Variables Definition Size ,  The Napierian Logarithm of a firm’s total assets, to control the relationship be-tween a firm’s size and its performance Dividend_dummy ,  Dividend payout dummy: if the observation pays dividends on time i, the varia-ble is equal to 1, otherwise it is equal to 0. CapitalExpenditure_a ,  The ratio of capital expenditure over total assets, which controls the effects of growth opportunities. CF_a ,  Using a firm’s cash flow, scaled by total assets, to control the relationship be-tween a firm’s operations and its performance Cash_s ,  The ratio of cash to sales, to control the influences of liquidity.  CEO_TS ,  CEO options-to-shares outstanding, to control the potential relationship between agent costs and a firm’s performance 
Year To control the effects of time  
Industry To control industry effects 
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4.3.1. Further Empirical Analysis 
Table 11 shows the results for the relationship between derivative use and ROA as the 
measure of firm performance for the two sub-samples with ROA value higher and lower 
than the median value of the full sample, respectively. As shown in Column 1 in Table 11, 
the coefficient for the effect of derivative use carries a negative sign for the sub-sample with 
better performance (ROA > median), indicating a potentially negative effect on Tobin’s Q 
as a measure of firm performance, but this effect is not significant. On the other hand, the 
negative effect of derivative use for sub-sample with poorer performance (ROA < median) 
is highly significant. These results clearly demonstrate that derivative use has a negative 
effect on performance, mainly for those firms that performed poorly. 
Table 11. The effects of derivatives usage on Tobin’s Q for groups separated by the median ROA 
value 1. 
 ROA > Median (0.0370) ROA < Median (0.0370) 
Derivative_dummy −0.047 −0.089 *** 
 (−1.47) (−2.70) 
Size −0.364 *** −0.511 *** 
 (−42.89) (−64.77) 
Dividend_dummy −0.024 0.036 
 (−0.53) (0.69) 
Capital Expenditure 0.203 *** 0.130 ** 
 (2.99) (2.05) 
Cash Holding 0.100 *** 0.173 *** 
 (4.62) (7.77) 
Cash Flow 0.399 *** 0.101 * 
 (7.04) (1.79) 
CEO_TS 0.087 ** −0.025 
 (2.51) (−0.61) 
Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 3756 3202 
R2 0.649 0.755 
Adjust R2 0.643 0.751 
1 In this table, the sample is grouped by the median value of ROA (0.0370). For the group in which 
ROA is greater than the median value, the use of derivatives has no significant impact on firm value. 
For the group in which ROA is less than the median value, a significantly negative relationship 
between derivatives usage and firm value has been found (at 99% confidence). t—statistics in pa-
rentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
As previously described, we also created two sub-samples based on the difference 
between firms that have a ROE value higher and lower than the median value of the full 
sample. We examined the effect of derivate use on Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm per-
formance, and the results of regression analysis are shown in Table 12. For the sub-sample 
of firms with higher ROE value (Column 1), the effect of derivative use has a negative 
value, but this negative coefficient is statistically insignificant, suggesting that derivative 
use does not have a significant effect on Tobin’s Q as firm performance. On the other hand, 
the effect of derivative use on Tobin’s Q is negative and significant for the sub-sample 
with lower ROE value (Column 2). These results confirmed the findings from Table 11. 
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Table 12. The effects of derivatives usage on Tobin’s Q for groups separated by the median ROE 
value 1. 
 ROE > median (0.0700) ROE < median (0.0700) 
Derivative_dummy −0.051 −0.069 ** 
 (−1.47) (−2.16) 
Size −0.395 *** −0.529 *** 
 (−45.70) (−65.48) 
Dividend_dummy −0.032 0.015 
 (−0.61) (0.33) 
Capital Expenditure 0.195 *** 0.147 ** 
 (2.59) (2.52) 
Cash Holding 0.194 *** 0.172 *** 
 (7.88) (8.76) 
Cash Flow 0.488 *** 0.140 *** 
 (7.92) (2.70) 
CEO_TS 0.130 *** −0.011 
 (3.39) (−0.31) 
Control Year and Industry YES YES 
N 3521 3441 
R2 0.676 0.741 
Adjust R2 0.670 0.737 
1 In this table, the sample is grouped using the median value of ROE (0.0700). Similar to Table 10, for 
the group in which the ROE is greater than the median value, the use of derivatives has no significant 
impact on firm value. For the group in which ROE is less than the median value, a significantly nega-
tive relationship between derivative usage and firm value is found (at 95% confidence). t—statistics 
in parentheses ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
4.3.2. Robustness Tests 
For the robustness test, observations have been grouped, for both ROA and ROE, into 
those which occupy the lowest 25% of the whole sample and the highest 25% of the whole 
sample. The model of Carter et al. (2006) has also been used in this test. The condensed 
data represents the extreme observations from the sample and leads to a stricter test. It is 
expected that the relationship between derivatives usage and Tobin’s Q will be significant 
and negative in the groups that represent the firms with the lowest ROA and ROE. Fur-
thermore, it is expected that this relationship will be insignificant in the groups that rep-
resent the firms with the highest ROA and ROE. The results of this robustness test are 
shown in Tables 13 and 14. 
Table 13 shows that, for the firms in the group with the lowest 25% ROA, using deriv-
atives has a −0.075 effect on their value (Tobin’s Q), which is significant at the 99% confi-
dence interval. Conversely, when it comes to the firms in the group that have the highest 
25% ROA, derivative usage does not have any impact on a firm’s value. 
Table 13. The effects of derivative usage on Tobin’s Q for groups with high and low ROA 1. 
 ROA > p75（0.0670） ROA< p25（0.0140） 
Derivative_dummy 0.116 −0.075 *** 
 (1.17) (−2.73) 
Size −0.374 *** −0.485 *** 
 (−16.33) (−72.06) 
Dividend_dummy −0.195 0.016 
 (−1.25) (0.37) 
Capital Expenditure 0.272 0.112 ** 
 (1.21) (2.07) 
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Cash Holding 0.096 0.159 *** 
 (1.44) (8.51) 
Cash Flow 0.026 0.137 *** 
 (0.14) (2.87) 
CEO_TS 0.328 *** 0.012 
 (3.37) (0.36) 
Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 539 4345 
R2 0.669 0.746 
Adjust R2 0.633 0.743 
1 This table presents the relationship between the use of derivatives and firm value by using a more 
extreme grouping method. The sample is separated into two groups; one includes the firms which 
have the greatest 25% ROA from the total sample (0.0670), and one includes firms with the lowest 
25% ROA from the total sample (0.0140). In keeping with the previous findings, for the group with 
lower ROA, derivative usage has a significantly negative impact on firm value (at 99% confidence), 
whereas, for the group with higher ROA, there are no significant effects on firm value from using 
derivatives. t—statistics in parentheses ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
The same grouping method was used for ROE (as shown in Table 14). Although the 
coefficient of derivative usage, in the group which includes firms with the lowest 25% 
ROE (−0.062), is slightly lower than the group in which observations are lower than the 
median value of ROE of the sample (−0.069), the significant and negative relationship sub-
stantiates the previous findings. 
Table 14. The effects of derivatives usage on Tobin’s Q for groups with high and low ROE 1. 
 ROE > p75 (0.113) ROE < p25 (0.030) 
Derivative_dummy −0.028 −0.062 ** 
 (−0.44) (−2.34) 
Size −0.412 *** −0.500 *** 
 (−25.70) (−73.99) 
Dividend_dummy −0.016 0.027 
 (−0.15) (0.69) 
Capital Expenditure 0.291 * 0.148 *** 
 (1.68) (2.95) 
Cash Holding 0.241 *** 0.187 *** 
 (4.02) (11.28) 
Cash Flow 0.240 * 0.221 *** 
 (1.93) (5.02) 
CEO_TS 0.466 *** 0.096 *** 
 (5.35) (3.28) 
Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 955 5033 
R2 0.737 0.726 
Adjust R2 0.721 0.723 
1 This table presents the relationship between the use of derivatives and firm value by using a more 
extreme grouping method. The sample is separated into two groups: one includes the firms which 
have the greatest 25% ROE from the total sample (0.113), and one includes firms with the lowest 
25% ROE from the total sample (0.030). In keeping with the previous findings, for the group with 
lower ROE, derivative usage has a significantly negative impact on firm value (at 95% confidence), 
whereas, for the group with higher ROA, there are no significant effects from using derivatives on 
firm value. t—statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. 
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In summary, through conducting additional regression analyses by splitting full sam-
ples into sub-samples along the two dimensions of ROA and ROE, respectively, our fur-
ther analyses and robust tests confirmed the results generated from our initial analysis 
regarding the relationship between derivative use and firm performance. 
5. Conclusions 
This study aims to examine derivative use as the hedging against financial risks at the 
firm level in the research setting of emerging economies. While investment to financial de-
rivatives is quite common for firms from developed economies, it is still a newly emerged 
economic and business phenomenon. Thus, there is a need to study firms’ derivative use in 
the context of firms from emerging economies. This study addresses two research questions 
regarding investment in financial derivatives by firms from emerging economies: (1) what 
factors at the firm level leads firms to invest in financial derivatives? (2) Can derivative use 
lead to improvement of a firm’s performance? These two research questions are examined 
in the context of Chinese firms that were listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Empirical 
data were collected from the CSMAR. In addition, data regarding firms’ derivative use were 
collected manually for all the individual firms included in the sample. In total, the full sam-
ple includes 15,309 firm-year observations, covering a period of 11 years from 2005 to 2015.  
To address the first research question, we followed prior studies in the developed econ-
omy setting to examine whether the firm characteristics in terms of firm size, operational 
cash flow, R&D investment, tax shield, the possibility of bankruptcy, and firm ownership 
would result in firms’ investment in financial derivatives. To address the second research 
question, we adopted the conceptual model developed by Lau (2016) for regression analysis. 
Further, we performed additional analyses and robust tests to examine the relationship 
between derivative use and firm performance by splitting the full sample into sub-sample 
along the two dimensions of ROA and ROE. 
This study contributes to the literature of derivative use by providing the following 
empirical findings based on a research setting of firms from China as a leading emerging 
economy. First, our study has identified firm characteristics of firm size, operational cash 
flow, R&D investment, tax shield, and the possibility of bankruptcy as the factors that de-
termine firms’ decision to invest in financial derivatives. Second, firms’ ownership struc-
tures in terms of state-owned or private ownership do not affect a firm’s decision on deriv-
ative use. Third, as a general tendency, derivative use has a negative effect on the firm’s 
performance, and state-owned or private ownership does not change this negative effect. 
Fourth, firms with poorer performance are more likely to invest in financial derivatives, but 
derivative use tends to further reduce, rather than improve the performance of these firms. 
These empirical findings have theoretical as well as practical implications regarding 
derivative use by firms from emerging economies such as China. First, prior research iden-
tified an association between certain firm-specific characteristics and firm investment in 
financial derivatives in the context of firms from developed economies (Allayannis and 
Ofek 2001; Haushalter 2001; Kuersten and Linde 2011; Titman and Grinblatt 2002). The 
empirical evidence based on our empirical findings confirmed such association in the set-
ting of firms from China as an emerging economy. Secondly, but more importantly, our 
empirical findings shed new light on the relationship between derivative use and firm 
performance. Prior research in the context of firms from developed economies suggests 
that derivative use tends to lead to improvement of firm performance (Allayannis and 
Weston 2001; Carter et al. 2006). The findings from our study provide empirical evidence 
of a negative effect of derivative use on firm performance. Moreover, while firms with 
poorer performance are more likely to invest in financial derivatives with the purpose of 
facilitating the improvement of performance, derivative use by these firms would further 
reduce their performance. We think that two factors may contribute to such a vicious cycle. 
The first is the serious flaws in the development of the derivatives market in developing or 
emerging economies, given its status of late development and poor institutional quality. The 
second is firms’ lack of experienced professionals to operate the transactions for investment 
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in financial derivatives. Third, the empirical findings regarding the relationship between 
derivative use and firm have practical implications both for the policymakers and manage-
rial executives in the emerging economy setting. For the policymakers in developing and 
emerging economies, it is important to provide a business environment with high institu-
tional quality for the development of derivative market performance. For the managerial 
executives of firms in developing and emerging economies, it is imperative to develop the 
skills and expertise required to effectively operate investments in financial derivatives. 
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